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The government has responded to misleading advertising by banning it, engaging in counter-advertising
and taxing the product. In this paper, we consider the social welfare effects of those different responses
to misinformation. While misinformation lowers consumer surplus, its effect on social welfare is ambiguous.
Misleading advertising leads to overconsumption but that may be offsetting the under-consumption
associated with monopoly prices. If all advertising is misinformation then a tax or quantity restriction
on advertising maximizes social welfare. Other policy interventions are inferior and cannot improve
on a pure advertising tax. If it is impossible to tax misleading information without also taxing utility












Cambridge, MA  02138
ujhelyi@fas.harvard.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
How should government policy respond to misleading advertising? The class i ce c o n o m i cp a p e r so n
advertising assume either that advertising provides useful information about consumer products
(Nelson, 1970) or that advertising shapes preferences (Dixit and Norman, 1978, Becker and Murphy,
1993), but sometimes advertising is misleading. In the nineteenth century, a variety of false claims
were made about the health beneﬁts of patent medicines that were just disguised alcohol. In the
1940s and 1950s, cigarette companies tried to convince consumers that their products were healthy
(Cutler and Glaeser, 2006). Is the appropriate policy response to ban falsec l a i m so rt ot a xt h e
product or to produce government advertisements with an alternative viewpoint?
One laissez-faire view is that there is little cause for government intervention because these
public relations eﬀorts are ineﬀective. While there are many reasons to be suspicious about gov-
ernment intervention, it is implausible that ﬁrms would spend signiﬁcantly on misinformation if
that spending did nothing. A second view is that despite the ﬂaws of private decision-making,
government decision-making is worse (Glaeser, 2006). Without disputing that view, we present a
simple model to examine the potential beneﬁts of diﬀerent policy responses to misinformation.
We assume that Cournot oligopolists sell a good with unobserved health costs or beneﬁts.
Following Dixit and Norman (1978) and Becker and Murphy (1993), these ﬁrms can invest in
advertising which increases the taste for the good. Follow Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Shleifer
(2006), ﬁrms can also invest in advertising can manipulate beliefs and create misinformation. We
focus on misinformation about the health consequences of the product.
If consumer receive none of the ﬁrms’ proﬁts, then misinformation always reduces consumer
surplus, when surplus is deﬁned to reﬂect true health costs .If all proﬁts accrue to consumers, then
misinformation is only harmful if it increases consumption beyond the level that would occur in a
competitive market with perfect information. Since consumers typically underconsume the products
of an oligopoly, misinformation helps correct this underconsumption. In cases with considerable
health costs, like cigarettes, this eﬀect is more likely to be a intellectual curiosity than an important
insight. In other cases, like patented drugs where the gap between prices and marginal costs is
high, misinformation that overstates the health beneﬁts of the drug may really increase welfare by
oﬀsetting the under-consumption due to high prices. This result is similar to the idea that public
misinformation overstating the private costs of risky behavior (like unsafe sex) may be optimal if
that behavior has externalities.
Firms invest in misinformation and we focus on the case where advertising is product, not sup-
plier, speciﬁc. Cigarette ﬁrms can convince smokers that cigarettes aren’t harmful but not that
their brand is not harmful. The earliest Federal Trade Commission interventions into cigarette
advertising speciﬁcally banned brand speciﬁc health claims. This assumption means that ﬁrms
don’t internalize the beneﬁts that their advertising has for other ﬁrms, and leads to the prediction
that advertising will decrease with the number of ﬁrms. Monopolists reduce consumer surplus
both because they set high prices and because they strongly invest in misinformation. The equi-
2librium level of misinformation by a monopolist will always exceed the welfare maximizing level of
misinformation.
We consider the eﬀects of three diﬀerent forms of government intervention: taxes or bans on
advertising, counter-advertising and taxes on proﬁts or goods. If advertising is just misinforma-
tion, then taxes or bans on advertising yield second best options that weakly dominate all other
government interventions. Counter-advertising where the government tries to refute private ﬁrms
is sub-optimal because it creates a costly advertising response by the private ﬁrms. Price caps
and taxes on consumption can be welfare enhancing, but they yield less social surplus than directly
taxing or limiting advertising. A change in the tax code that stops ﬁrms from deducting advertising
expenses is equivalent to a tax on advertising and yields similar results
If advertising both misleads and increases utility, as in Becker and Murphy (1993) then bans or
taxes on advertising are less eﬀective. In our model, good and bad forms of advertising complement
each other and you cannot reduce misinformation without reducing other forms of advertising. This
eﬀect would be exacerbated if the government could not diﬀerentiate misinformation from more
benevolent forms of advertising. In that case, government counter-advertising may increase welfare
even if there is an optimal tax on misinformation. Since optimal taxes on advertising are low
because such taxes also reduce preference-increasing advertising, counter-advertising may still have
a positive eﬀect. Taxes on consumption are not welfare increasing if there is an optimal advertising
tax.
If there are multiple market segments, then ﬁrms will target segments of consumers that are
more elastic in their consumption decisions. This fact suggests that it mayb em o r er e m u n e r a t i v e
to direct misleading advertising towards young people. This may mean that banning advertising
towards the young raises social welfare even if the young are no more likely to be confused than
t h em o r em a t u r e .
We are not suggesting that there are markets where government action against misinformation is
currently warranted. Indeed, one of our results is that misinformation may not be so bad. However,
this paper does show that if all advertising is misinformation, then bans on advertising raise welfare
more than government attempts to advertise an alternative view. Conversely, when ﬁrms engage in
both misinformation and welfare enhancing advertising, then it is welfare enhancing to have both
bans on advertising and counter-advertising.
2 Misinformation and Policy
We now review two cases where the government has responded to misleading advertising: patent
medicine and cigarettes. In the case of patent medicines, the primary response was a ban on misin-
formation. In the case of cigarettes, the Federal Trade Commission ﬁrst tried to ban misinformation,
then the government supported counter-advertising and ﬁnally turned to taxation.
At the end of the nineteenth century, sixty million dollars of patent medicine was being sold
annually. “In many instances, however, the medicines were ineﬀectual. Some of the syrups con-
3tained as much as 80 per cent alcohol; many of the tonics used cocaine and morphine. Some of the
medicines destroyed health, and make drunkards and dope addicts out of their users” (Weinberg
and Weinberg, 1961, p. 176). The advertisements can be stunning in their audacity. Weinberg and
Weinberg (1961) cite an ad for Dr. Bye run in the socialist journal Appeal to Reason that claimed
“cancer cured with soothing balmy oils.” Adams (1905, contained in Weinberg and Weinberg,
1961) describes “Peruna” which was “at present the most prominent proprietary nostrum in the
country.” Despite the fact that Peruna’s active ingredient appears only to have been alcohol, it was
advertised as preventive against yellow fewer and “no matter what you’ve got, you will be not only
enabled, but compelled, after reading Dr. Hartman’s Peruna book, The Ills of Life, to diagnose
your illness as catarrh, and to realize that Peruna alone will save you.”
Patent medicines were misleadingly advertised, and the ads seem to have been eﬀective. Firms
spent a lot of money on advertising. The president of the National Association of Patent Medicine
Men claimed in 1900 that between one-third and one-half of patent medicine revenues were spent
on advertising the products. It is hard to imagine that this expenditure wou l dh a v eo c c u r r e di f
it didn’t have an eﬀect. Many patent medicines had identical medical properties to other cheaper
substitutes (i.e. whiskey) and sold for much more. The price diﬀerence between whiskey and patent
medicine would be hard to understand if the advertising didn’t have an eﬀect.
The government response to the patent medicine trade was the Pure Food and Drug Act of
1906. Among other things, the act forbade the sale of misbranded food or drugs “the package or
label of which shall bear any statement, design, or device regarding such article, or the ingredients
or substances contained therein which shall be false or misleading in any particular way.” The act
also gave the Food and Drug Administration authority over the sale of food and drugs and led
to the requirement of prescriptions on many pharmaceuticals. The governme n td i dn o te n g a g ei n
counter-advertising (i.e. saying that patent drugs were bad for you) or taxation. It just banned
misleading advertising.
Since the 1906 ban on false advertising, there are no cases quite as egregious as 19th century
patent medicines, but cigarette advertisers certainly tried to make their products seem healthy. For
example, one advertisement claimed:
“Repeated nationwide surveys show that more doctors smoke Camels than any other
cigarette. A few years ago, 113,597 doctors in every branch of the medical profession
were asked this question: What cigarette do you smoke, doctor? The brand named most
was Camel...you see, doctors smoke for pleasure just as you and I. So what do they look
for? Flavor and mildness. So smoke the cigarette that so many doctors smoke.”1
These claims may not have been factually incorrect, but they do give the misleading impression
that cigarettes were medically attractive. Of course, Camels were not the only cigarette trumpeting
1Text is from a television advertisement available at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-
1259818256007769353&q=cigarette+commercials&pl=true.
4their appeal to doctors. Another slogan ran ”Doctors recommend Phillip Morris.” Old Golds were
sold with the line “Not a Cough in a Carload.”
The Cigarette industry didn’t stop with catchy slogans. In the wake of the 1952 Reader’s Digest
article “Cancer by the Carton” that brought the medical research linking cigarettes and cancer to
the wider public, tobacco ﬁrms organized “Tobacco Industry Research Committee.” The scientiﬁc
director of this committee, Dr. Clarence Little, then appeared on Edward R. Murrow’s “See It
Now,” and in response to Murrow’s question “have any cancer-causing agents been identiﬁed in
cigarettes,” Little responded “none whatsoever.” After giving even-handed treatment to Little
and his opponents, Murrow declared that “we have no credentials for reaching conclusions on this
subject.” Murrow continued smoking the cigarettes that would lead to his death at age 57 from
lung cancer.2
The earliest public response to misleading advertising of cigarettes followed the route of the
FDA. The Federal Trade Commission ﬁrst complained about cigarette companies misleadingly
suggesting health beneﬁts from their brands and in 1950 received a court injunction to stop an Old
Gold advertisement that claimed it was “lowest in nicotine and tars.” In 1954, the FTC insisted
that “no advertising should be used which refers to either the presence or absence of any physical
eﬀect of smoking.” Early lawsuits, such as Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds in 1957, tried unsuccessfully
to sue ﬁrms for misleadingly advertising a cancer causing product.
The Surgeon General’s Report of 1964 was a major example of what we will refert oa sc o u n t e r -
advertising: an attempt by the government to push an alternative viewpoint. The Surgeon General’s
report led to health warnings on cigarette packages. Continuing the counter-advertising trend, the
Federal Communications Commission ruled that fairness required television stations to broadcast
anti-cigarette advertising that would counter their cigarette advertising. This policy led to free
air time for the public health opponents of smoking. In 1970, cigarette ads on television ended
completely, although anti-cigarette advertising continued.
Litigation eventually managed to impose large judgments on cigarette companies and misleading
advertising was a prominent justiﬁcation for the judgments. While the early settlements, such as
the 1996 Liggett Group settlement involved a lump-sum transfer, later settlements more closely
resembled taxes on future sales. The Master Settlement between State Attorneys General and the
tobacco industry required payments of more than $200 billion over 25 years, but those payments
were indexed to operating revenue, which makes them as much a tax as a classic settlement.
While conventional tobacco taxes and bans were not explicitly justiﬁed as ar e s p o n s et om i s l e a d i n g
advertising, some of the enthusiasm for those policies might be associatedw i t ha n t i p a t h yf o rp r i o r
advertising policies.
The ﬁrst public policy responses to misleadingly advertising cigarettes were advertising bans and
counter advertising, but something like cigarette taxes eventually followed. In the next sections of
the paper, we will consider the welfare eﬀects of those diﬀerent responses to misleading advertising.
2Text is available at http://tobaccodocuments.org/ness/31311.html
53 Misperception and welfare
We now turn to a simple model of misperception and welfare. The are J identical ﬁrms, who pay
constant marginal costs (which we take to be 0 for simplicity), and compete Cournot-style in selling
a product. There are N people who each receive beneﬁts of a·i if they consume the product where
a is a constant and i is uniformly distributed on the unit interval. There is also a true health cost
of consuming the product which we denote c. The value of c is not known and we assume that all
individuals believe that the health cost to them of consuming the product isˆ c, which is possibly
erroneous. We let ε ≡ c − ˆ c ≥ 0 denote the error. We ﬁrst ask about the welfare consequences of
an exogenous error and then endogenize the level of error.
I ft h ep r o d u c ti ss o l da tp r i c eP, then demand equals Q(P)=N
a (a − ˆ c − P). Cournot behavior
means that qj = q(ε)=
N(a−ˆ c)
a(J+1), so that equilibrium sales, price and proﬁts are given by
Q(ε)=








(a − ˆ c)2
a(J +1 ) 2 (3)
Total sales, price, and proﬁts are all increasing in the error. When there are more ﬁrms, the
positive eﬀect of the error on total production becomes larger (QεJ > 0), because more ﬁrms
increase their output in response to a higher demand (although each individual ﬁrm responds less:
qεJ < 0). At the same time, the positive eﬀect of ε on price and proﬁts becomes smaller as the
market turns more competitive. The decreasing price eﬀect is a direct consequence of QεJ > 0,
since the direct eﬀect of ε on price P(Q)=a−ˆ c− a
NQ is independent of the number of ﬁrms. The
decreasing eﬀect of the error on proﬁts is a consequence of the well-known competitive externality
that Cournot ﬁrms impose on each other. This externality is stronger when there are more ﬁrms,
and therefore the error ε increases proﬁts by less in this case. Under perfect competition, a small
increase in the error has no ﬁrst-order eﬀect on either price or proﬁts.
3.1 The welfare eﬀect of misinformation
What is the impact of misinformation on welfare and consumer surplus? The primary distinction
between this paper and Dixit and Norman (1978) is that we focus on consumer surplus based on
the true health costs of the product, not on consumer surplus based on beliefs and preferences at
the time of purchase. If we consider utility based on beliefs at the time of purchase, then almost all
advertising, misleading or not, is beneﬁcial. We refer welfare based on the true health costs of the
product as “ex-post consumer surplus,” CSxpost(ε). We also consider ex-post welfare which equal
6proﬁts plus consumer surplus: Wxpost(ε) ≡ Π(ε)+CSxpost(ε).3 Proposition 1 follows (all proofs are
in Appendix A).
Proposition 1 Ex-post consumer surplus is decreasing in the error ε. Ex-post welfare is increasing





Consumer surplus declines with misperception, ε, because misperception increases the equilib-
rium price in (2). This increase in price represents a transfer to ﬁrms, and condition (4) tells us that
social welfare rises with misinformation as long as the error is small. Social welfare is maximized
when output is equal to the competitive output where price equals zero and everyone knows the
true health costs of the good. In that case, output is Qc(ε =0 )=N
a (a − c). Condition (4) is
then necessary and suﬃcient for Q(ε) <Q c(0) : the equilibrium output with imperfect competition
and misinformation, given by (1), is less than the ﬁrst-best quantity. Equivalently, condition (4) is
necessary and suﬃcient for P(ε) >ε : for the equilibrium price to be larger than the error. In this
model, with demand given by Q(P)=N
a (a−c+ε−P), reducing price or raising the error has the
same impact on the equilibrium quantity Q(ε). As price rises, the error needs to rise to achieve the
ﬁrst best quantity Qc(0) which means that the optimal error is larger in less competitive markets.
Since Cournot behavior implies that too little of the good is being consumedr e l a t i v et ot h e
social optimum, misinformation that increases consumption oﬀsets this underconsumption. Since
imperfect competition leads to high prices and too little consumption, unless we are in a competitive
equilibrium, some misinformation will always increase welfare. Naturall y ,t h i sd o e sn o tm e a nt h a t
the level of misinformation in the case of either patent medicines or cigarettes was optimal. This
positive eﬀect of misinformation won’t impact consumer surplus but it will increase proﬁts and
it is because we include proﬁts in social welfare that this quantity rises with misinformation, as
illustrated in Figure 1. As the inverse demand curve shifts out, area A is the reduction in consumer
surplus of existing consumers, and area B is the losses to new consumers who buy based on the
wrong beliefs. These losses are oﬀset by an increase in ﬁrm proﬁts, and do notr e d u c ew e l f a r e .T h e
area that drives welfare is C, which is the (true) utility that new consumers get from consuming the
product. Even though the net surplus of these new consumers is negative because their expenditure
is B+C,a r e aC nevertheless represents a social gain: it is deadweight loss turned into proﬁts. This
gain will exist and welfare will increase with misinformation as long as there is any deadweight loss
under the true preferences, until the error is so large that output reaches the intercept Q0 = N
a (a−c),
which is the competitive output level under the true preferences. The levelo fε∗(J) deﬁned under
(4) is the ﬁrst-best level of misinformation, since it guarantees that the competitive level of output
is produced.
3We ignore all issues concerning non-comparability across individuals (orﬁ r m s ) .
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Figure 1: Welfare eﬀect of ε.
When all consumers have the same health costs of using a product, the presence of misinfor-
mation is not enough to indicate a problem. The key question is whether too much of the good
is being sold relative to the ﬁrst best. In the case of cigarettes, we may be conﬁdent that health
costs are so high that very few people should smoke, but in other cases, misinformation may ben-
eﬁcially counter other market imperfections that cause under consumption. The welfare eﬀects of
misinformation become much more complicated if there are heterogeneous health consequences of
consumption in the population. In that case, misinformation can create added welfare losses by
inducing the “wrong” people to consume.
Misperception might also have consequences in other areas of consumers’ lives. For example,
underestimating (or underestimating) the health consequences of a disease might lead to too much
(or too little) of other forms of risky behavior beyond consuming the product.
The result in Proposition 1 follows Dixit and Norman (1978). They also considered the possible
welfare gains of increasing demand holding preferences ﬁxed (which they labeled advertising), but
they emphasized the possibility that the resulting increase in output might increase consumer
surplus. The result above is complementary to theirs, since welfare increases even though the price
of the product increases and hence consumer surplus is always reduced.
3.2 Other Social Welfare Functions
Other deﬁnitions of social welfare will qualify the result in Proposition 1. If we care more about
consumer surplus than proﬁts so W(ε,φ)=CS(ε)+φΠ(ε), where φ<1, then
∂W(ε,φ)
∂ε > 0a sl o n g
as
φ>
(a − ˆ c)+( J +1 ) ε




8The assumption that φ<1, of course, implies that consumers don’t own the ﬁrms and that the
government lacks the ability to tax away ﬁrms’ proﬁts. As long as φ>. 5, some misinformation
will continue to be welfare enhancing.
While the “ex post” measure of consumer surplus has some merit since it reﬂects the true
health-cost c, one can also argue for looking at “ex ante” consumer surplus CSxante, based on the
consumer’s erroneous beliefs.4 As Fisher and McGowan (1979) argue, the hedonic interpretation
of utility can be seen as suggesting that it is the consumer’s own judgement of his well-being that
really matters.
If the good provides an intertemporal ﬂow of consumption, and tomorrow the consumer is going
to realize his mistake today, then perhaps we might care about a weighted sumo fe xa n t ea n de x
post utility:
CSγ(ε) ≡ (1 − γ)CSxpost(ε)+γCSxante(ε),
where γ<1 is a constant. Deﬁne the corresponding welfare measure as Wγ(ε)=Π ( ε)+CSγ(ε).
Note that ex ante consumer surplus includes the error ε in the utility of the average consumer, so
that
CSxante(ε)=CSxpost(ε)+εQ(ε). (5)
Putting any weight on ex-ante surplus brings us closer to Dixit and Norman (1978) and strength-
ens the appeal of misinformation:.
Proposition 2 CSγ is increasing in the error as long as
γ>
ε + a−ˆ c
J+1
a − ˆ c + ε
.
Wγ(ε) is increasing in the error as long as
γ>
ε − a−ˆ c
J+1
a − ˆ c + ε
The ﬁrst part of the proposition implies that compared to true preferences, a small error will
improve consumer surplus as long as the weight on ex-ante consumer surplus is at least γ> 1
J+1.
When the market is perfectly competitive, any positive weight on ex-ante surplus implies that
small amounts of misinformation increase consumer surplus. In this perfectly competitive market,
misinformation only aﬀects quantity, not price. The impact that misinformation has on surplus
through changes in quantity consumed will be second order. The direct impact of misinformation
4Ex ante consumer surplus CSxante is computed as (E[ai|ai − ˆ c>P ] − P − ˆ c)Q, where E[ai|ai − ˆ c>P]i st h e
average utility from the product of those who chose to consume it.
9on the hedonic ﬂow of utility included in ex ante surplus is ﬁrst order. In competitive markets,
there is a threshold weight γ at which a small error raises this weighted consumer surplus. The
weight required for ε to improve weighted social welfare is always smaller than the threshold to
improve weighted consumer surplus because welfare includes proﬁts.
4 Endogenous misinformation and welfare
4.1 Endogenous misinformation
The discussion above has taken the error as exogenous. In the remainder of the paper we assume
that it is produced by the ﬁrms. We do not address the psychology of persuasion which is the topic
of Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Shleifer (2006). Instead, we assume that for a cost, ﬁrms can
mislead consumers. Speciﬁcally, we assume that if each of the J identical ﬁrms spends Zj dollars
on misinforming the consumers, the error will be ε = ε(
P
Zj), where ε(·) is an increasing function
that is suﬃciently concave for second order conditions to hold.
Our assumption that advertising is a public good among the ﬁrms makes the model more
relevant in some markets than in others. As we have discussed, in the 1950s the Federal Trade
Commission specially banned cigarette companies from making ﬁrm-speciﬁc health claims. More
generally, some public good component is arguably present in any advertisement. Even the most
idiosyncratic drug advertisement informs some consumers about the risks of a particular condition.
Any cigarette add showing vibrant outdoorsy people smoking suggests a connection between tobacco
and health. We therefore think that our results have at least some relevancei nt h ew e l f a r ee v a l u a t i o n
of any misleading advertising.5
In the model, ﬁrms choose their spending Zj simultaneously.6 We focus on the symmetric
equilibrium with Zj = Z for all j. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium level of
advertising and how it is aﬀected by the parameters of the model.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium advertising level Z solves
2N
a(J +1 ) 2(a − c + ε(JZ))ε0(JZ) − 1=0 . (6)
Total advertising expenditure increases with market-size (
∂(JZ)
∂N > 0), decreases with the true health-
cost (
∂(JZ)
∂c < 0), and decreases with the number of ﬁrms (
∂(JZ)
∂J < 0).
This proposition describes the determinants of misinformation. Larger markets will inspire more
misinformation because the beneﬁts of misinformation are proportional to market size but the costs
are not. If the costs of misinformation rose with market size, then this result could disappear. As
5Appendix C discusses an extension in which misleading advertising is a private good.
6Given symmetry, the assumption of simultaneous moves only aﬀects the distribution of proﬁts among the ﬁrms.
It has no impact on ε or any of the other quantities of interest.
10real health costs rise, the incentive to misinform declines, because the impact the error will have
on demand and price will be smaller. As competition rises, misinformation falls. This is a classic
example of the free rider problem. All ﬁrms beneﬁt by confusing consumers about the costs of the
product, but if there are too many ﬁrms, they will fail to invest in this industry-level public good.
This result would disappear if misinformative advertising was ﬁrm-speciﬁc, which is why the highly
competitive ﬁeld of patent medicine had abundant amounts of misinformative advertising.
4.2 Welfare eﬀects
If we are concerned with ex post consumer surplus, then Proposition 3 shouldl e a dc o n s u m e ra d -
vocates to fear monopoly because of high prices and misinformation. Monopolists have stronger
incentives to mislead consumer which further reduces ex post consumer surplus. As the market
approaches perfect competition, then Proposition 3 implies that the equilibrium level of misinfor-
mation goes to zero.7
We now include advertising costs in proﬁts so that Π(Z)=Π ( ε(JZ))−JZ, where Π(ε(JZ)) is
total proﬁts deﬁned under (3). Ex post welfare is then given by Wxpost(Z)=CSxpost(ε(JZ))+Π(Z).
Let ε∗∗(J) denote the welfare-maximizing level of misinformation, given that it is supplied at a cost
born by competing ﬁrms, which we deﬁne as the second-best level of misinformation. If ﬁrms invest
in misinformation to maximize their proﬁts, then the level of equilibrium misinformation can still
be either too high or too low:
Proposition 4 The second-best level of misinformative advertising Z∗∗ satisﬁes
JN
a(J +1 ) 2(a − c − Jε(JZ∗∗))ε0(JZ∗∗)=1 ( 7 )
and we denote the corresponding error ε∗∗(J).
The value of ε∗(J) is always greater than ε∗∗(J) because ε∗∗(J) takes the costs of advertising
into account and optimal misinformation must therefore be lower. Even though misinformation
will increase welfare in the monopoly case, the equilibrium level of misinformation is always too
high. The monopolist doesn’t internalize the negative impact that misinformation has on social
welfare and therefore produces too much misinformation.
5 Regulating misleading advertising
In this section, we study some of the possible regulatory responses to misleading advertising and
their welfare consequences. The interventions we consider are (i) a tax or a ban on advertising; (ii)
7Moreover, Proposition 2 implies that if ex ante consumer surplus enters into our CS measure with any positive
weight, starting from a competitive equilibrium, a small exogenous increa s ei nt h ee r r o ri sb e n e ﬁ c i a l . I nt h i sc a s e ,
perfect competition provides too little error.
11product market regulations, including sales and proﬁt taxes and price control (iii) rival advertising
or other changes in the ﬁrms’ technology of misinformation. A direct tax (or, equivalently, a partial
ban) on misinformation can implement the second-best. We then show that indirect instruments,
such as product market regulations or rival advertising, are generally inferior. One exception is a
tax on proﬁts gross of advertising costs, which in this model also yields the second-best.
5.1 Taxing or banning advertising
The second-best level of misinformation ε∗∗ can be implemented using either a tax or a quantity
restriction (partial ban) on misinformation Z. The level of misleading advertising Z∗∗ for which
ε∗∗ = ε(JZ∗∗) is determined implicitly by (7). To achieve this level of misleading advertising, the
regulator may set a quantity limit on Z equal to ¯ Z = Z∗∗. Alternatively, a tax rate τZ (with a
lump-sum rebate) may be set such that
τZ =
2N
a(J +1 ) 2(a − c + ε(JZ∗∗))ε0(JZ∗∗) − 1,
in which case, from (6), the equilibrium level of misinformation will be exactly Z∗∗.
The simple equivalence of taxes and bans breaks down if we allow for entry (which we study
in Appendix C), or the possibility of targeting regulations to speciﬁc market segments (which we
discuss in Section 7 below). Appendix B shows the diﬃculties which arise if regulation aﬀects
diﬀerent ﬁrms diﬀerently, perhaps because some of them ﬁnd a way to circumvent the ban.
5.2 Rival advertising and changes in the technology of persuasion
Assume now that the government can take some action Zg aﬀecting the technology of persuasion,
so that the error becomes ε(
P
Zj,Z g). We will refer to Zg as “rival advertising” aimed at educating
the consumers. Assume ε1 > 0,ε 11 < 0 as before, and let ε2 < 0. Deﬁne x . = −ε2ε1
a−ˆ c and x0 . = ε2ε11
ε1
(from second order conditions and the assumptions on ε we know that 0 <x<x 0).
We ﬁrst discuss the eﬀects of rival advertising on misinformation and then turn to the welfare
eﬀects of these policies.
5.2.1 Rival advertising and misinformation
Proposition 5 An increase in rival advertising Zg (i) reduces both misleading advertising and the
error if ε12 <x ; (ii) increases misleading advertising and reduces the error if x<ε 12 <x 0; (iii)
increases both if ε12 >x 0.
When government advertising reduces the marginal eﬀect of ﬁrm advertising, because ε12 ≤ 0,
an increase in government advertising always reduces misinformation. However, when ε12 > 0, the





Figure 2: Rival advertising with ε12 > 0.
to government advertising by increasing their own advertising to such an ex t e n tt h a tt h ea m o u n t
of consumer error (ε) actually rises. A diﬀerent interpretation of this result is that increasing the
eﬀectiveness of ﬁrms’ misinformation technology can be useful if that increase ends up reducing
the amount of ﬁrms’ investment in misinformation. When ε11
ε1 + ε1
a−ˆ c is large in absolute value, then
ﬁrm advertising responds less to public advertising and in that case, the range of ε12 for which
public advertising will both increase ﬁrm advertising and reduce consumer error is larger.
We illustrate Proposition 5 in the case of three diﬀerent misinformation technologies.




Zj − Zg), so that government advertising simply reduces
the “stock” of advertising responsible for misinformation. One can check that in this case ε12 = x0,
therefore Proposition 5 implies that ε remains constant, and government advertising has no eﬀect
on the equilibrium level of misinformation.
Example 2 The reduction in the stock of misleading advertising that the government can achieve
is inversely proportional to the stock itself: ∆Z =
µ1Zg
Z and the relationship between the stock of
advertising and misinformation is linear: ε(Z,Zg)=µ2(Z − ∆Z)=µ2(Z − µ1
Zg
Z ) (where µ1,µ 2
are constants). In this case, ε12 >x 0 for ε>0, therefore, from Proposition 5 such an intervention
will always result in an increase in misinformation. Examples 1 and 2 are illustrated in Figure 2.
In both cases, as Zg increases holding Z constant, ε shifts out horizontally.
Example 3 Consumers believe that a product is either “unhealthy”, with health cost c, or “healthy”,
with health cost c − ε0, with probabilities (1 − r) and r, respectively. Firms can inﬂuence these
(subjective) probabilities by investing in advertising (for example, by increasing the number of ads
claiming or suggesting that the product is “healthy”), so that r = r(Z),r 0 > 0,r 00 < 0. The
government can inﬂuence consumers’ perceptions of what “healthy” and “unhealthy” mean, i.e., it
13can aﬀect the consumers’ estimate of the diﬀerence in health costs between the two products.8 Let
ε0 = ε0(Zg) with ε0 < 0, so that the government can take actions to show that a claim of healthiness
implies a lower diﬀerence in health costs that consumers would have thought.
Because in this formulation the expected health cost is c−rε0, we may write ε(Z,Zg)=r(Z)ε0(Zg).
One can check that the assumptions of Proposition 5 are satisﬁed with ε12 < 0, therefore such an
intervention always reduces misinformation.
Example 4 Misinformation only aﬀects the beliefs of a fraction u of the population (the “uni-
formed”), while fraction (1 − u) always holds correct beliefs.9 As long as the uN uninformed indi-
viduals have the same distribution of taste parameters i as the population, the model is equivalent
to one where misinformation aﬀects everyone, but the error that the ﬁrms canc r e a t ei suε(JZ).




(a − ˆ c − P)+
(1 − u)N
a




(a − c + uε − P),
which is equivalent to a model with ˆ c = c − uε.
If the government has the ability to reduce the fraction of uninformed individuals, so that u = u(Zg),
then we are back in the previous example with ε(Z,Zg)=ε(Z)u(Zg), and increasing Zg always
reduces misinformation.10
How does rival advertising compare to a direct tax or quantity control on misinformation in
terms of reducing the error ε? One way of making the comparison is to focus on small changes in
policies, and ask whether a change in Zg, τZ, or a combination of these is more eﬀective (i.e. yields
a larger decrease in the error). The result is given in the following proposition (where x0
− ≡ x0 −ε1
and x0
+ ≡ x0 + ε1).
Proposition 6 A tax is more eﬀective at reducing the error than rival advertising iﬀ x0
− <ε 12.
Combining taxation and rival advertising is more eﬀective than a tax alone iﬀ ε12 <x 0
+.
Proposition 6 is illustrated in Figure 3, where the instruments are ranked a c c o r d i n gt ot h e i re f -
fectiveness at reducing the error in the various ranges of ε12. When ε12 <x , government advertising
8This is a simple way of modelling “truth-content” regulations which eﬀectively deﬁne what certain words or
phrases commonly used in advertisements have to mean. More generally, this assumption also captures the notion
that ﬁrms usually provide information about the products they produce, while government campaigns might provide
more generic information about the desirability of general classes of products, technologies, inputs/ingredients etc.
9For example, Z might be an advertisment that has the potential of being misunderstood as claiming something
w h i c hi su n t r u e( e . g .t h a tad r u gi sl e s s risky than it in fact is). The assumption is that a fraction u of the population
misunderstands the ad.
10For example, the government could send Zg messages about true health-cost, which are received randomly in the
whole population. Then, measure of informed agents is (1 − u0 + u0
Zg
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has a multiplicator eﬀect on consumer error by inducing ﬁrms to reduce their private advertising,
as seen in Proposition 5. In that case, rival advertising will always be more eﬀective than a tax
(combining public advertising and a tax is even more eﬀective). When x0
− >x(the case depicted
in the Figure), this ranking will also hold for a range above x, so that government advertising is
more eﬀective than a tax despite the induced increase in private advertising. This requires that the
direct eﬀect of public advertising on consumer error to be suﬃciently large.11
Once ε12 >x 0
−, taxation will become more eﬀective than rival advertising. However, combining




if the impact of public advertising on consumer error is large enough, combining public advertising
with a tax to limit ﬁrms’ response will lead to a larger eﬀect on consumer error than a tax alone.
This holds even in a range above x0, where public advertising alone would increase the error.
Finally, when ε12 >x 0
+, the induced increase in private advertising will always outweigh the direct
beneﬁt of rival advertising, and using only a tax dominates the combined policy.
5.2.2 Rival advertising and welfare
Using the results in Section 3, the welfare analysis of rival government advertising can be undertaken
b a s e do nP r o p o s i t i o n5 .
Corollary 1 Ex post consumer surplus is increased by rival advertising Zg if and only if ε12 <x 0.
This follows from the fact that private advertising only enters consumer surplus through con-
sumer error. Even though ε12 ∈ [x,x0] implies an increase in private advertising in response to
government advertising, the cost of which are born by the ﬁrms, these costs do not aﬀect consumer
utility, and ex post consumer surplus increases if and only if consumer error is reduced. We now
consider total welfare, which includes consumer surplus, proﬁts, and the cost of ﬁrm advertising.
To make the best case for government advertising, we ignore its costs.
11Formally, x
0
− >xiﬀ ε2 · SOC
∗ >ε 1.
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Figure 4: Welfare eﬀect of Zg (positive: +, negative: -, ambiguous: ?).
Corollary 2 The welfare eﬀects of rival advertising Zg are positive when (ε12 <xand ε>ε ∗),
ambiguous when (ε12 <xand ε∗ >ε>ε ∗∗), (x0 >ε 12 >xand ε>ε ∗) or (ε12 >x 0 and ε<ε ∗∗),
and negative otherwise.
This corollary is illustrated in Figure 4, showing the welfare eﬀects of public advertising are
a function of the equilibrium error and the impact of public advertising on the eﬀectiveness of
private advertising, ε12. The ﬁgure shows the optimal direction of the policy, if the government
can decide to increase or decrease its advertising. Even if we assume that the equilibrium error is
excessive, reducing misinformation through rival advertising unambiguously increases welfare only
if the intervention does not increase the eﬀectiveness of ﬁrm advertising too much (ε12 <x ). In all
other cases, the welfare eﬀect of public advertising is at best ambiguous, and often strictly negative.
These diﬃculties with rival advertising suggest that, even if free, such a policy is inferior to the
direct tax or quantity control on misinformation studied above. This observation is formalized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Once an optimal tax or quantity limit on misleading advertising is in place,r i v a l
advertising by the government cannot improve welfare.
165.3 Product market regulations
5.3.1 Taxing production
Suppose that the government levies a tax τ on the product (with revenues rebated lump sum), so
that each ﬁrm’s objective function in the Cournot game becomes




As the following Proposition shows, such a tax always reduces misinformation. Nevertheless, its
eﬀect on consumer surplus may well be negative.
Proposition 8 An increase in the product tax always reduces the error ε. However, it increases
prices, and its eﬀect on consumer surplus is negative whenever
ε0[a − τ − c − (J +2 ) ε]
−[(ε0)2 +( a − ˆ c − τ)ε00]
<J(a − c − τ) − ε. (9)
A tax on production makes misinformation less proﬁtable, and the resultingd e c r e a s ei nm i s -
leading advertising raises consumer surplus. This eﬀect is shown on the left hand side of (9). At
the same time, the tax leads to an increase in prices as ﬁrms pass the tax burden on to consumers
(for given ε). The resulting decrease in consumer surplus is the right hand side of (9). This nega-
tive eﬀect is larger the more ﬁrms there are, because each reduces its production slightly without
internalizing the full eﬀect of the resulting price increase. Whenever (9) holds, consumer surplus is
reduced.
5.3.2 Price caps
Because misinformation increases the price of the product, capping prices may be among the
regulatory responses considered. The eﬀects of introducing a price cap ¯ P below the equilibrium
price P(ε(JZ)) are described by the following proposition.
Proposition 9 A smaller price cap ¯ P reduces misinformation. However, in general, the second-
best level of misinformation cannot be implemented with a price cap.
The price cap reduces the proﬁtability of misinformation and therefore reduces the level of
misleading advertising. At the same time, the cap also has a direct positive eﬀect on demand,
and the resulting increase in sales moves the equilibrium closer to the competitive output. This
implies a decrease in the level of the error that is desirable in the second-best. By changing the
price cap the regulator is changing both the equilibrium and the target level of ε, a n di ng e n e r a l
the second-best cannot be implemented in equilibrium.
175.3.3 Taxing proﬁts without allowing advertising cost deductions
Consider taxing proﬁts instead of production. Taxing proﬁts net of advertising costs has no eﬀect
on ﬁrm behavior, merely redistributes wealth from the ﬁrms to the consumers (under a rebate). If
however, tax policy does not allow advertising costs to be deducted from ﬁrms’ tax base then the
ﬁrms’ objective in the advertising game becomes
π(Zj,τπ)=( 1− τπ)
N(a − ˆ c)2
a(J +1 ) 2 − Zj, (10)
where τπ is the proﬁt tax.
Assuming that tax revenues are rebated to consumers lump sum, the tax has no direct eﬀect
on welfare. Thus, the welfare eﬀects work entirely through the ﬁrms’ choice of advertising level Z,
a n dw eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t .
Proposition 10 A tax on proﬁts always reduces Z, and can implement the second-best level of
misinformation ε∗∗.
While the second part of the Proposition may seem surprising, it is a simple consequence of the
fact that a tax (1 − τπ) on proﬁts gross of advertising costs is equivalent to a tax 1 + τZ = 1
1−τπ
on misleading advertising (see (10)), and we saw in Section 5.1 that the latter policy can always
implement the second-best.
6 Advertising that increases utility
6.1 Firms’ problem and welfare
We now turn to the more realistic assumption that advertising has both positive and negative
eﬀects. Like Becker and Murphy (1993), we allow advertising to directly increase utility. We also
continue assuming that advertising misleads consumers. We now assume that people’s utility from
the product is a0 +a·i with i ∼ U[0,1]. Demand is Q(P)=N
a (ˆ a−ˆ c−P), where ˆ a ≡ a0+a.F i r m s
now can invest in both misleading advertising Zj and advertising that increases consumers’ utility.
We let Yj denote expenditure on utility-increasing advertising, and we assume that a0 = a0(
P
Yj),
where a0 is increasing and concave. For symmetry reasons, we assume that both forms of advertising
have the same public good aspect to them.
Utility-increasing advertising tends to raise the desirability of havinga tl e a s tas m a l le x o g e n o u s
error. Proposition 1 implies that a larger level of utility-increasing adv e r t i s i n g( al a r g e ra0)w i l l
increase the positive eﬀect of misperception on welfare. The next proposition implies that this eﬀect
is reinforced when advertising levels are chosen optimally, because a larg e re r r o ri nt u r ni m p l i e sa
higher equilibrium level of utility-increasing advertising.
18Proposition 11 The equilibrium levels of utility-increasing advertising Y and misleading advertis-
ing Z are complements for the ﬁrms (∂Y
∂Z > 0). The comparative statics of Proposition 3 continue
to hold: a rising N and a declining c increase both Z and Y , and increasing the number of ﬁrms J
reduces both total misleading advertising JZ and total truthful advertising JY.
We also ﬁnd that.
Proposition 12 An increase in misleading advertising Z raises welfare if and only if







(ˆ a − c)(J2+J2 − 2) + ε(J − 2)
(J2 +2 )
. (11)
On the right-hand side of (11), the ﬁrst term is the threshold below which misleading advertising
is suboptimal in a market equilibrium with no useful advertising. The second term on the right-
hand side is positive, so that with useful advertising, the equilibrium level of misinformation will
more often be suboptimal. This eﬀect reﬂects the complementarity between misleading and utility-
increasing advertising described in Proposition 11. As a lower level of misleading advertising also
implies a lower level of utility increasing advertising, improving welfare requires tolerating a higher
level of misinformation. As the curvature of ε relative to a0 (ε00
a00
0 ) rises, a given change in misleading
advertising yields a larger change in utility enhancing advertising, so that the complementarity
becomes stronger, and a higher level of misinformation becomes desirable, as (11) shows.
6.2 Regulating misinformation in the presence of utility-increasing advertising
We now turn to the impacts of diﬀerent policies when ﬁrms provide both misleading and useful
advertising. Under a tax, the reduction in misinformation is larger than in the benchmark case of
no useful advertising because of the complementarity between the two types of advertisements.
Proposition 13 A tax (or partial ban) on misleading advertising reduces the equilibrium levels of
both Z and Y. Moreover, the presence of Y magniﬁes the eﬀect of the policy on Z:t h er e d u c t i o n
in misleading advertising is larger than what it would be holding a0 constant.
When utility increasing advertising is also present, regulating Z a l o n ec a n n o ta c h i e v et h es e c o n d -
best level of misinformation ε∗∗. The most a tax (or a ban) can achieve is some third best, ε∗∗∗(J),
which is the level of misinformation providing highest welfare taking into account the equilibrium
relationship between misleading advertising and utility-increasing advertising. This third-best level
of misinformation is given implicitly by the right-hand side of (11). To achieve it, the tax rate τZ






19where Y ∗∗∗ denotes the equilibrium level of utility-increasing advertising corresponding to Z = Z∗∗∗.
The diﬃculties with a ban on misinformation would be even more severe if the government can-
not diﬀerentiate misinformation from useful advertising. This case corresponds more to cigarettes
than to patent medicine. The Camel adds which shows doctors smoking Camels and Marlboro ad-
vertisements showing healthy cowboys smoking are probably both utility enhancing and misleading.
The complementarity of misleading and utility-increasing advertising implies that a tax (or quan-
tity restriction) on misleading advertising reduces both the level of misinformative advertising and
the level of useful advertising.
We now turn to rival advertising. As before, when government advertising aimed at reducing
the error raises the eﬀectiveness of ﬁrm advertising, ﬁrms’ optimal response may lead to an increase
in the error. On the other hand, when rival advertising is eﬀective at reducing the error, it will
also induce a reduction in useful advertising, which will yield a further decrease in misleading
advertising. Thus, in the presence of utility-increasing advertising, the eﬀect of rival advertising on
misinformative advertising will more often be negative.
Proposition 14 Using the notation x . = −ε2ε1
ˆ a−ˆ c and x0 . = ε2ε11
ε1 corresponding to Proposition 5, rival





0)2. It reduces the error as well as






0)2 > 1, the threshold for public advertising to have a negative eﬀect on
misleading advertising is higher than before. Because private misinformative advertising and public
advertising only aﬀect the equilibrium level of utility-increasing advertising through the amount
of consumer error, the condition for rival advertising to reduce the error i st h es a m ea si nt h e
benchmark model. A smaller error also reduces utility-increasing advertising.
With utility-increasing advertising, the result of Proposition 7 no longer holds: even if an opti-
mal tax or quantity limit on misleading advertising is in place, rival advertising by the government
can sometimes improve welfare.





(ˆ a − c)(J2+J2 − 2) + ε∗∗∗(J − 2)
ˆ a − ˆ c
+
JN
a(J +1 ) 2(ˆ a − c − Jε∗∗∗)ε2 > 0. (12)
The second term in (12) is the direct eﬀect of rival government advertising on welfare through
the consumer error. As in Proposition 7, this is always negative. The ﬁrst term represents the
direct eﬀect of public advertising on useful advertising.12 It is positive as long as ε12 < 0, in which
case public advertising has a direct positive eﬀect on useful advertising. If this ﬁrst term is large
12This direct eﬀect is not accounted for by the change in Z, and it is therefore not optimized out when Z is
optimally regulated.
20enough, the eﬀect of rival advertising on welfare will be positive even if an optimal tax or quantity
limit on private advertising is already in place.
Can a tax on production also improve upon an optimal direct tax or ban on misleading adver-
tising? As the following Proposition shows, the answer is negative.
Proposition 16 Once an optimal tax or quantity limit on misleading advertising is in place,at a x
on production cannot improve welfare.
In Proposition 15, rival advertising was able to improve upon direct regulation because the
former policy has an asymmetric impact on misleading and utility-increasing advertising. Therefore,
rival advertising is able to implement changes in advertising levels which a single instrument cannot
replicate. With product taxes, things are diﬀerent. Such an instrument aﬀects the optimal levels
of misleading and useful advertising symmetrically, i.e. it does not change their relationship in
equilibrium. Therefore, any change in advertising levels brought about by a product tax can
be implemented with a direct tax on misinformation, and an optimal advertising tax cannot be
improved upon.
It is easy to see that this intuition carries over to the case of proﬁt taxes (without allowing for
the cost deduction of either type of advertising). Because such a tax also aﬀects misinformation
and useful advertising symmetrically, it cannot improve upon an optimal advertising tax, as the
following proposition shows.
Proposition 17 Once an optimal tax or quantity limit on misleading advertising is in place,at a x
on proﬁts cannot improve welfare.
7M a r k e t T a r g e t i n g
Some of the most contentious discussions of misleading information concerns advertising to children
who are presumably more prone to believe misinformation. To address this, we assume there are
two market segments and return to the case where all advertising is misinformation. The ﬁrst
one is the “high-valuation” segment, where the utility from the product is given by a · iH with
iH ∼ U[ψa,1], where ψ<1 is a constant. In the second, “low-valuation” segment, utility is a · iH,
with iH ∼ U[0,ψa]. For simplicity, assume that the relative size of the two segments reﬂect their
valuations, so that there are ψN and (1 − ψ)N individuals in each segment respectively.
If each ﬁrm can choose how much to invest in advertising in each of the two market segments
(denoted by ZL and ZH respectively), the following proposition shows that they will never invest
in both segments.
Proposition 18 Consider the level of advertising Z∗ which satisﬁes 2N
a(J+1)2(a−c+ε(JZ∗))ε0(JZ∗)=
1. If
J(ψa− c)+( ψ − 1)a>ε (JZ∗), (13)
21then in equilibrium, only the low-valuation segment gets positive advertising, with Z∗
L = Z∗ and
Z∗
H =0 . If the reverse holds, then only the high-valuation segment gets positive advertising, with
Z∗
H = Z∗ and Z∗
L =0 .
Firms earn higher proﬁts if they can target their ads to consumers that will respond to them
more. The proposition implies that regulatory policies will only be eﬀective at reducing misinfor-
mation if they encompass the market segment that ﬁrms are targeting. For example, if (13) holds,
a ban which only aﬀects the high-valuation segment will be ineﬀective. If a ban has diﬀerential
impact in the two segments, only its impact in the targeted segment matters.
The possibility of targeting regulation may aﬀect regulatory costs (hence welfare). If targeted
bans or taxes are feasible, the enforcement costs of such policies may be lower than attempting to
regulate misinformation in the entire market. Similarly, counter-advertising targeted at the relevant
market segment may be cheaper than also providing information to non-marginal consumers. The
proposition suggests that banning advertising to the young may be eﬃcient even if the young think
as clearly as adults. If ﬁrms target the young because they are new consumers who are particularly
likely to respond to advertising, then it may make sense to particularly ban advertising against this
group.
8C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have examined the impact of misinformation on social welfare and the impacts of
diﬀerent governmental responses to misinformation. Our ﬁrst result was that misinformation may
not be socially ineﬃcient. If a monopoly has high prices and then misleads people into consuming
more, and if monopoly proﬁts are distributed across the population, then misinformation can be
welfare enhancing. Consumer error leads to more consumption which oﬀsets the underconsumption
due to monopoly prices. Misinformation is more likely to be welfare reducing when prices are
closer to marginal costs than in a more monopolistic setting. When misleading advertising was
endogenized, we found that monopolies will always produce too much misinformation.
When advertising only acts to misinform, then the second best outcome can be created by a
tax on advertising or an equivalent quantity control. Counter-advertising by the government is
ineﬃcient both because it may have its own costs and because it can increase ﬁrm advertising.
Taxes on sales and price caps also fail to replicate the second best outcome. These results suggest
that quantity restrictions on false advertising in the spirit of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906
may have been an eﬃcient response to the problem of misleading advertising of patent medicine.
When advertising both misinforms and increases utility, then the results are more nuanced. A
simple tax on advertising cannot yield the second best outcome because the tax reduces both good
and bad forms of advertising even if the ban only applies to misinformation because the two types
of advertising are complements. If an optimal tax is put in place, then it mays t i l lb eo p t i m a lf o r
the government to engage in counter advertising detailing the health costs of the product. Taxes on
22the product do not increase welfare given an optimal tax or ban on advertising. This result suggest
that the government policy towards cigarettes that both limited some forms of ﬁrm advertising
and engaged in counter-advertising may have been eﬃcient. However, responding to misleading
advertising with a tax on cigarettes seems less likely to be eﬃcient relative to using other policy
levers.
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AA p p e n d i x : P r o o f s
A.1 Misperception and misleading advertising
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Ex-post consumer surplus may be computed as the average utility of those individuals who
chose to consume the product,
J(a−c)−ε(J+2)
2(J+1) ,13 times the number of consumers, Q(ε)=J
N(a−ˆ c)
a(J+1).









Rearranging gives the expression in the text.
23This gives
CSxpost(ε)=JN
(a − c)2J − (a − c)ε − ε2(J +2 )
2a(J +1 ) 2 . (14)
Ex-post welfare is Wxpost(ε) ≡ Π(ε)+CSxpost(ε). Adding (3) and (14) and taking derivatives one
can check that (4) is necessary and suﬃcient for
dWxpost
dε > 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
For the ﬁrst part, write CSγ(ε)=CSxpost(ε)+γεQ(ε) and use the deﬁnitions in (1) and (14)
to ﬁnd the derivative as
−JN
a − c + ε(J +2 )
a(J +1 ) 2 + γ
JN(a − c +2 ε
a(J +1 )
.
Rearrange to get the condition. Use (3) and the expression above to derive the second condition.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
Using (1) and (2), in the advertising game, ﬁrm j’s proﬁt is given by
π(Zj)=
N(a − c + ε(
P
Zj0))2
a(J +1 ) 2 − Zj.
The equilibrium value of the average advertising level Z ≡ 1
J
P
Zj is determined by the ﬁrst order
condition (6). The second-order condition is
2N
a(J +1 ) 2[(ε0)2 +( a − c + ε)ε00] < 0. (15)
It will be convenient to use the notation SOC ≡ (ε0)2 +( a − ˆ c)ε00,a n dSOC∗ ≡ SOC
(a−ˆ c)ε0 (the
latter is SOC around the equilibrium, obtained by substituting (6) into the left-hand side of (15)).




Zj = Z∗ is an equilibrium. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium with Zj = Z∗ ∀ j.
The comparative statics can be obtained directly from (6) and (15).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Welfare is
CS(ε)+Π ( ε) − JZ =
JN







a(J +1 ) 2(a − c − Jε)ε0 − 1
¸
24This equation implies that the socially optimal level of adverting is
JN
a(J +1 ) 2(a − c − Jε(JZ∗∗))ε0(JZ∗∗)=1 .
and we deﬁne ε∗∗ = ε(JZ∗∗)
A.2 Regulation
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5




−ε2ε1 − (a − ˆ c)ε12
J((ε1)2 +( a − ˆ c)ε11)
, (16)







(a − ˆ c)(ε2ε11 − ε1ε12)
(ε1)2 +( a − ˆ c)ε11
, (17)
which is negative iﬀ ε12 <x 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6


















{[−ε2ε1 − (a − ˆ c)ε12]dZg +( a − ˆ c)ε1dτZ} + ε2dZg. (18)
We want to compare (18), and dε under the tax only policy, ε1








−ε2ε1 − (a − ˆ c)ε12 +( a − ˆ c)ε1 +
ε2
ε1
[(ε1)2 +( a − ˆ c)ε11] > 0
x0 + ε1 >ε 12,
where we have substituted in SOC =( ε1)2 +( a − ˆ c)ε11.
P r o o fo fc o r o l l a r y2












































dZg in Propositions 4 and
5, the welfare eﬀects may be signed unambiguously for a large portion of the parameter space using
(20) and (21).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7















Under an optimal tax or quantity limit, the term in brackets is 0. Because ε = ε∗∗ under such a





a(J +1 ) 2(a − c − Jε∗∗)ε2.
Because ε∗∗ <ε ∗ = a−c
J ,a n dε2 < 0 by assumption, this expression is negative. Thus, starting
from an optimal tax, rival government advertising can only reduce welfare.
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J+1 , and the equilibrium proﬁt is π(ε,τ)=
N(a−ˆ c−τ)2
a(J+1)2 . Thus, price increases in the production
tax.
The ﬁrst order condition of the advertising game is
2N
a(J +1 ) 2(a − ˆ c − τ)ε0 − 1=0 , (22)
and write the corresponding second order condition as SOC∗(τ)= 2N
a(J+1)2
©
(ε0)2 +( a − ˆ c − τ)ε00ª
<






2a(J +1 ) 2[(a − τ − c)2J − 2(a − τ − c)ε − ε2(J +2 ) ] .
The derivative w.r.t. τ is proportional to
−[a − τ − c +( J +2 ) ε]
∂ε
∂τ
− J(a − c − τ)+ε.
Using (22) to ﬁnd ∂ε
∂τ = ε0
−[(ε0)2+(a−ˆ c−τ)ε00] and rearranging yields the condition in the text.
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With capped prices, equilibrium sales are given by Q∗ = N
a (a− ˆ c− ¯ P). A ﬁrm’s proﬁt becomes
πj(Zj)= ¯ P(a − ˆ c − ¯ P) N




With ε00 < 0, we get ∂Z
∂ ¯ P > 0.
Here, CS(ε, ¯ P)=
³
a−ˆ c− ¯ P
2 − ε
´
a−ˆ c− ¯ P
a N, and the condition
∂(Π+CS−JZ)
∂Z = 0 deﬁning the
second-best is N
a ( ¯ P − ε)Jε0 − J =0 . Using the ﬁrst order condition (23), this becomes ¯ P J−1
J = ε.
Clearly, this condition and (23) will in general yield a diﬀerent ε.
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where SOC∗(τπ) ≡ (1 − τπ)( ε0
a−ˆ c + ε00
ε0 ). For the second part, note simply that a tax (1 − τπ)o n
proﬁts gross of advertising costs is equivalent to a tax 1+τZ = 1
1−τπ on misleading advertising (see
10), and we saw in Section 5.1 that the latter policy can always implement the second-best.
A.3 Utility-increasing advertising
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a(J +1 ) 2 − Zj − Yj.
27First-order conditions are
2N(A + a0 + ε)ε0
a(J +1 ) 2 =1
and
2N(A + a0 + ε)a0
0
a(J +1 ) 2 =1 .






be negative semi-deﬁnite, where
h11 =
2N
a(J +1 ) 2[(ε0)2 +( ˆ a − ˆ c)ε00]
h12 =
2N




a(J +1 ) 2[(a0
0)2 +(ˆ a − ˆ c)a00
0].
(As before, we focus on symmetric equilibria in which Zj = Z and Yj = Y for all j.) The ﬁrst
order conditions imply that ε0(JZ∗)=a0
0(JY∗) in equilibrium. Because ε00 < 0a n da00
0 < 0, it
follows that ∂Y ∗
∂Z∗ > 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 2
The sum of consumer surplus and proﬁts is JN
2a(J+1)2[(2 + J)(ˆ a − c)2 +2 ( ˆ a − c)ε − Jε2]. The
derivative w.r.t. Z is





a(J +1 ) 2[(ˆ a − c − Jε)ε0 +( ( ˆ a − c)(2 + J)+ε)a0




0(JY), Y 0 is ε00
a00
0 , and using both, we get
∂(CS +Π− JZ− JY(Z))
∂Z







(ˆ a − c)(J2+J2 − 2) + ε(J − 2)
J2 +2
.
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J detH to ∂Z
∂τZ|a0=const. = 1
Jh11, one can verify that ∂Z
∂τZ < ∂Z
∂τZ|a0=const. < 0, so
that the presence of Y magniﬁes the eﬀect of τZ on Z.
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where ¯ H =
a(J+1)2
2N H. Solving, we ﬁnd
∂Z
∂Zg
= −(ˆ a − ˆ c)




J det ¯ H
therefore ∂Z













(ˆ a − ˆ c)[(ˆ a − ˆ c)a00
0 +( a0
0)2](ε11ε2 − ε1ε12)
J det ¯ H
T h em i d d l et e r mi nt h en u m e r a t o ri s( ac o n s t a n tt i m e s )h22, which is negative, therefore dε
dZg < 0





0(ˆ a − ˆ c)
−ε2ε11 + ε12ε1
J det ¯ H
,
therefore ∂Y
∂Zg < 0i ﬀε12 <x 0.
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We saw that in equilibrium, ε0 = a0
0. This now becomes ε0(JZ,Zg)=a0
0(JY), we can therefore
write Y (Z,Zg) as the equilibrium level of utility-increasing advertising as a functiono fZ and Zg.
Denoting ∂Y

























When the direct regulation of misleading advertising Z is optimally set, the term in brackets is















(ˆ a − c)(J2+J2 − 2) + ε∗∗∗(J − 2)
ˆ a − ˆ c
+
JN
a(J +1 ) 2(a − c − Jε∗∗∗)ε2.
Therefore dW
dZg is positive if and only if (12) holds.
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Under a product tax, the ﬁrst-order conditions become
2N(A + a0 + ε − τ)ε0
a(J +1 ) 2 =1
and
2N(A + a0 + ε − τ)a0
0
a(J +1 ) 2 =1 .
Therefore ε0(JZ)=a0
0(JY) holds in equilibrium, which in turn implies that
∂Y(Z)
∂τ = 0: the product
tax has no eﬀect on the equilibrium relationship between Y and Z.



















When the direct regulation of misleading advertising Z is optimally set, the term in brackets is








a(J +1 ) 2(a − c − Jε∗∗∗ + Jτ),
which is negative.
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Under a product tax, the ﬁrst-order conditions become
(1 − τπ)
2N(A + a0 + ε)ε0
a(J +1 ) 2 =1
30and
(1 − τπ)
2N(A + a0 + ε)a0
0
a(J +1 ) 2 =1 .
We again have ε0(JZ)=a0









dτπ = 0 when a tax on Z has been optimally set.
A.4 Market Targeting
Proof or Proposition 18
Denote ε(JZL)=εL and ε(JZH)=εH. Given the distribution of tastes, the demand function




a − c + εH − P
(1 − ψ)a
¸
(1 − ψ)N +m a x
·
0,




Assume ﬁrst that the equilibrium price satisﬁes P<ψ a −c. In this case, the whole high-valuation
segment will consume, and (24) becomes
Q(P)=( 1− ψ)N +








This inverse demand function has the same form as in the baseline case, so that the equilibrium is
characterized by the same ﬁrst-order condition 2N
a(J+1)2(a−c+ε(JZ∗
L))ε0(JZ∗
L)=1 . Since εH does
not aﬀect the price, ﬁrms will set Z∗
H =0 . Because the equilibrium price is given by P = a−c+εL
J+1 ,
the condition P<ψ a− c is equivalent to the condition (13) in the proposition.
Next, suppose that P>ψ a − c + εL in equilibrium, so that no-one from the low-valuation
segment consumes. Then (24) becomes
Q(P)=
a − c + εH − P
(1 − ψ)a
(1 − ψ)N,
and similar reasoning to the previous case shows that in equilibrium Z∗
L =0a n dZ∗
H is given by
2N
a(J+1)2(a − c + ε(JZ∗
H))ε0(JZ∗
H) = 1. Since εL =0 , the condition P>ψ a − c + εL is exactly the
reverse of (13).
What is left to show is that advertising in both segments cannot be an equilibrium. It follows
from our previous argument that only the case ψa − c<P<ψ a− c + εL needs to be checked.
Clearly, if P<ψ a − c + εH, then the whole high-valuation segment will consume, and targeting
advertising to the lower segment is optimal. Thus P<ψ a − c, contradicting the assumption we
31started with. If P>ψ a− c + εH, both segments consume, and the demand function becomes
Q(P)=
a − c + εH − P
(1 − ψ)a
(1 − ψ)N +








Because the two errors aﬀect the price symmetrically, concavity implies that ε0(JZ∗
H)=ε0(JZ∗
L)i n
equilibrium, so that ﬁrms advertising in both segments would do so in equal amounts. However,
this implies that P<ψ a− c + εL and P>ψ a− c + εH cannot both be true.
B Appendix: Asymmetric regulation
The discussion in the main text has relied on the fact that symmetric ﬁrms are regulated in a
symmetric manner. In reality, regulation might aﬀect ﬁrms diﬀerently for a number of reasons.
Enforcement of the regulation might be imperfect, or ﬁrms diﬀer in some attribute that does not
aﬀect productivity, but aﬀects the cost that a tax or ban imposes on them. Then e x tp r o p o s i t i o n
shows that asymmetries in regulation can lead to surprising redistributio n so fp r o ﬁ t sa c r o s st h e
ﬁrms. Moreover, as long as at least one ﬁrm escapes taxation or ﬁnds some way around the ban,
regulation has no impact on total advertising (hence welfare).
Proposition 19 (i) Assume that diﬀerent ﬁrms face diﬀerent limits on advertising. Unless the
overall limit imposed on ﬁrms is smaller than equilibrium total advertising with no regulation (JZ∗
0),
the policy has no eﬀect on total advertising. When the overall limit is smaller than JZ∗
0, every ﬁrm
will advertise the maximum amount it is allowed to.
(ii) Assume that diﬀerent ﬁrms face diﬀerent tax rates on advertising. In equilibrium, the ﬁrm with
the lowest tax rate will be the only one to advertise. If the lowest tax rate is 0, the advertising of
this ﬁrm will be JZ∗
0, so that regulation has no eﬀect on total advertising.
Proof. Let Z∗
0 denote equilibrium average advertising with no regulation, and assume the
government imposes a ban ¯ Zj on ﬁrm j.









¯ Zj <JZ ∗
0, the ﬁrst order conditions of the advertising game become
2N(a − c + ε(JZ))ε0(JZ)
a(J +1 ) 2 − 1 ≥ 0w i t hZj ≤ ¯ Zj complementarity,
implying that Z∗
j = ¯ Zj for all j.
32(ii) Let τ
j
Z be the tax on ﬁrm j, and, w.l.o.g., let τ1




Z. The ﬁrst order conditions of the
advertising game with taxation are
2N(a − c + ε(JZ))ε0(JZ)
a(J +1 ) 2 − (1 + τ
j




Z, only ﬁrm 1’s FOC will hold with equality, and it will be the only ﬁrm to advertise
a positive amount: Z1 = Z∗. If τ1
Z =1 , the equilibrium condition is the same as with no taxation,
therefore the same JZ∗ obtains.
The ﬁrst result implies that in this model, a ban will be ineﬀective as long asa tl e a s to n eﬁ r m
ﬁnds a way around regulation.
The second result implies that the ﬁrm with the lowest tax rate will bear the full burden of
providing the equilibrium level of advertising.14 When at least one ﬁrm escapes taxation, regulation
is purely redistributive. Compared to the symmetric equilibrium, that ﬁrm’s proﬁt decreases by
(J−1)Z∗
J and each of the other ﬁrms experiences an increase in proﬁts of Z∗
J . In this case, regulation
has no eﬀect on misinformation or welfare.
With more general (increasing) marginal costs, taxation will reduce total advertising, but less
than if the tax was uniform. Proﬁts will still be redistributed towards the ﬁrms facing a higher
tax rate. To illustrate this point, assume linear marginal costs kz. It can be shown that increasing
ﬁrm 1’s marginal cost k1 slightly above k reduces Z1 while increasing Zj j 6=1 . For a small change
starting from k1 = k, the change in total advertising is the same as with a uniform increase in k.
The only diﬀerence is the redistribution of proﬁts from j =2 ,...,J to j =1 . When the change is
larger in magnitude, or k1 6= k to start with, diﬀerential taxation leads to a smaller change in Z
than a uniform policy.
C Appendix: Private misinformation and entry
Consider now a version of the model in which misinformation is a private good. Write εj(Zj), and
assume that consumers have the same preferences as above. This implies thati fεj(Zj) <ε k(Zk),
everyone will buy from ﬁrm k and no-one buys from j.A s s u m eJ = 2 to simplify the discussion.





0i fZ2 <Z 1 (in which case Z2 =0i so p t i m a l )
N
(a−c+ε(2Z2))2
9a − Z2 if Z2 = Z1
N
(a−c+ε(Z2))2





One may check that if ﬁrms choose advertising levels simultaneously as before, no pure-strategy
14This is because in a public good game with constant marginal costs, everyone will free-ride on the contributions
o ft h el o w e s tc o s ta g e n ta sl o n ga sc o n t ributions are perfect substitutes.
33Nash equilibrium exists.15 Let us therefore assume that ﬁrm 1 chooses Z1 ﬁrst, and ﬁrm 2 responds
by choosing Z2.16
For any Z1, ﬁrm 2 will choose Z2 slightly above it, unless that would yield π2 ≤ 0, in which
case he prefers Z2 =0 . Given this, the unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is for 1 to choose
the Z1 yielding 0 proﬁts,17 deﬁned by
π(Z1)=N
(a − c + ε(Z1))2
4a
− Z1 =0 . (25)
Firm 2’s best response is to choose Z2 =0 . Thus, ﬁrm 1 uses misinformation to deter entry. In
the product market, Firm 1 acts as a monopoly, creates a deadweight loss by underproducing, but
earns 0 proﬁts. The equilibrium level of Z given in (25) is higher than any level observed in the
case where misinformation was a public good, including the case of public good with monopoly.
This discussion veriﬁes the following proposition:
Proposition 20 Allowing for entry, equilibrium misinformation will be higher than the proﬁt-
maximizing level under monopoly.
The eﬀects of regulating advertising are described in the following propositions. We see that
the case for regulating advertising is much stronger in this case than when misinformation was a
public good.
Proposition 21 A (partial) ban on advertising set suﬃciently high increases proﬁts as wella s
consumer surplus, hence raises welfare.
Proof. Suppose the limit ¯ Z on advertising is close to Z1 given in (25), so that it satisﬁes
N
(a − c + ε(2 ¯ Z))2
9a
− ¯ Z<0. (26)
Then the ban increases the proﬁt of Firm 1 without changing the structure of the equilibrium.
To see this, note that if π0 ≥ 0a tZ1, then ﬁrm 2 would enter with a higher Z, contradicting
the equilibrium. Thus, π0(Z1) < 0 necessarily. Moreover, if (26) holds, Firm 2 will still have no
incentive to enter. Therefore, a ban ¯ Z<Z 1 raises the incumbent’s proﬁt.
The derivative of consumer surplus is dCS
dZ = −JN
(a−c)2J−(a−c)ε−ε2(J+2)
2a(J+1)2 < 0 as before, thus,
banning Z increases both proﬁts and consumer surplus, leading to an increase in welfare.
15Firms’ best response is to outbid each-other until the monopoly proﬁt is 0. However, if both ﬁrms choose this
advertising level, they become a duopoly, with negative proﬁts, so they both prefer Z =0 . But if one chooses Z =0 ,
the other’s best response is to reduce his Z and make positive proﬁts.
16In the public good case, introducing sequential moves would have no eﬀect on the equilibrium Z
∗, and therefore
on any quantity of interest. The only diﬀerence would be to redistribute proﬁts between ﬁrms by inducing every ﬁrm
to free-ride on the one choosing its advertising level last.
17This result is analogous to that found in the theory of contestable markets (explaining why the threat of entry
could force monopoly proﬁts to 0).
34Proposition 22 (i) A small uniform tax of τZ leaves proﬁts unchanged while increasing consumer
surplus, so that welfare is raised.
(ii) If the entrant (ﬁrm 2) is taxed at rate τZ and the incumbent (ﬁrm 1) is taxed at a lower rate,
consumer surplus is raised by the same amount as in (i), but proﬁt increases, leading to a higher
welfare gain.
(iii) If the incumbent (ﬁrm 1) is taxed at rate τZ and the entrant (ﬁrm 2) is taxed at a lower rate,
2 will become a monopoly. This case yields the largest increase in consumer surplus, proﬁt, and
hence welfare.
Proof. (i) A uniform tax rate of τZ reduces Z as (25) becomes
N
(a − c + ε(Z1))2
4a
− (1 + τZ)Z1 =0 . (27)
Proﬁt is still 0, but consumer surplus increases due to reduction in misinformation. Thus, welfare
is raised.
(ii) If τZ,1 <τ Z,2 = τZ, equilibrium condition is again (27), yielding the same decrease in Z





4a −τZZ1, so welfare is increased by a larger amount.
(iii) If τZ,2 <τ Z,1 = τZ, then ﬁrm 1 cannot aﬀord the Z1 in (25) required to keep ﬁrm 2 out of
the market. Knowing this, he is forced to choose Z1 =0 . As a response, ﬁrm 2 will be a monopolist
in the advertising market, setting Z2 at its proﬁt maximizing level. Because Z2 is even lower than
in (ii), and proﬁt is maximized, this yields even higher welfare.
When misleading advertising is a private good, the equilibrium level of misinformation is higher
than in the public good case. Thus, the reason for regulatory intervention is stronger, and regulation
may yield unambiguous improvements in welfare.
In this model, the threat of entry forces the incumbent ﬁrm to overinvest in misinformation.
As Proposition 22, part (ii) shows, the regulator can increase welfare by creating entry barriers in
the form of higher tax rates for entrants. As part (iii) shows, even higher welfare is achieved if the
regulator eliminates the possibility of entry altogether, by forcing the incumbent ﬁrm out of the
market through higher taxes. (This outcome is equivalent to simply prohibiting one of the ﬁrms
from entering the market.)
In terms of optimal regulation in the presence of entry, the fundamental diﬀerence between the
policies is that some can create entry, while others cannot. In particular,at a xw i l ln e v e rg i v er i s e
to entry, therefore the second-best under duopoly, ε∗∗(2), is not attainable with this policy. It can
however implement ε∗∗(1), the second best under monopoly. A ban can create entry, and therefore
can implement the second-best under duopoly. Whether or not the second-best under monopoly
can be achieved depends on whether the corresponding level of advertising would induce entry.
35Proposition 23 A ban can achieve the second-best level of misinformation under duopoly, and
may or may not achieve the second-best under monopoly. Taxation can achievet h es e c o n d - b e s t
under monopoly, and cannot achieve the second-best under duopoly.
Proof. Let Zopt,J denote the advertising level which gives the second-best error ε∗∗(J)w i t hJ
ﬁrms. Then, Zopt,J solves the FOC of welfare maximization:
a − c − Jε(JZopt,J)
a(J +1 ) 2 JNε0(JZopt,J)=J.
Ab a n ¯ Z = Zopt,2 achieves the second-best under duopoly. It can achieve the second-best under
monopoly if and only if Zopt,1 satisﬁes
N
(a − c + ε(2Zopt,1))2
9a
− Zopt,1 < 0.
If this is not the case, ﬁrm 2 will enter with the same advertising level Zopt,1, and the market will
be a duopoly.
As explained in Proposition 22, taxation can never give rise to entry, therefore the duopoly
solution cannot be achieved with this policy. Under monopoly, the optimal policy is to choose the
tax τZ so as to solve
N
(a − c + ε(Zopt,1))2
4a
− (1 + τZ)Zopt,1 =0 .
In this case, Zopt,1 will be the level of advertising chosen by the incumbent to prevent entry.
36